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I. Introduction
This study is concerned with the determinants of wealth transfers
within families and between families. An important question which arises
irLthin the family is whether inheritance compensates the less advantaged
among its offspring,^ Put differently, do children with less education,
income, marital advantages, and the like receive a larger material inheri
tance which at least partially corrects for a lower real income relative
to their siblings? The present paper is addressed to this question.
A second set of issues relates to sources of differences between
families in the level of the wealth transfers. First, one could investi
gate which family characteristics were the more important in determining
the level of a particular kind of transfer. Second, one could explore
differences in the influences which these family characteristics have on
the different kinds of transfers. To illustrate the second point, educa
tional attainment may well be less elastic with respect to family income
than financial inheritance, and if this were true, inheritance would con
tribute more to inequality in wealth at the upper tail of the distribution,
while educational attainment and other forms of human capital would dominate
inequality at lower levels of wealth. "Hiese between family issues concerning
wealth transfers are also investigated in this study.
From a policy point of view, the issue of inheritance compensation
is not unimportant, since if there were truly little inequality in inheri
tance among descendents, the primary impact of effective transfer taxation
would be to narrow differences in transfers and wealth among families.
But if, in contrast, material inheritance were fundamentally compensatory
among descendents, thereby serving to mitigate wealth inequality within
families, effective transfer taxation would diminish wealth inequaltly
between families, but could conceivably increase it within families.
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The overall effect of the taxation on inequality would thus be rendered
2
uncertain. . therefore, an analysis of the covariance structure of inher
itances centered about the family is relevant to taxation policy. The
same point can be made even more forcibly in relation to material gifts
and inheritances combined, since there is some reason to believe that
gifts are larger than inheritances.
The data used in this study (\4hich I hereafter refer to as the Sustisan
data, after their principal collector) derive from a five perc^rt random
sample of probate records for Cleveland, Ohio in the year 1965. The probate
data were combined with information from interviews cf survivors, the
3
result being a sample of 659 estates and 1234 survUors. Due to the inter
view procedure, an unusual combination of variables was obtained, including
education of both decedents and recipients, which is most in^ortant in a
study of Intergenerational transmission. In addition, since the Sussman
data record both educational attainment and material Inheritance of recipients,
the interaction between the two kinds of transfers can be Investigated,
an analysis which has hitherto been impossible. Finally, because the data
record degree of kinship, a subsample of sons and daughters can be selected
to undertake a truly intergenerational study.^
Bie major findings which emerge from the study are first, that there
is little direct evidence that material inheritance is compensatory to
less well to do children in a family. Second, it appears that material
inheritance is more elastic with respect to the measure of family Income
than is educational attainment, and the estimate of the Income elasticity
for material inheritance exceeds 1.0, \^ile the estimate of the income
elasticity for educational attainment falls in the range of 0.3 to 0.4.
Third, the level of parental education significantly and positively influences
the level of children's education even though it is unrelated to material
f:
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inherltance, suggesting that parental education is biased towards transfers
in the form of human capital. Fourth, a measure of reverse contributions
by recipients to donors, usual monthly vists, does not significantly increase
either inheritance (oreducational attainment) inmost cases, suggesting that
Inheritance is not generally a payment for reverse transfers. Finally,
marital status of the decedent is an important factor - indeed, the single
most Important variable - in determining the size of children's material
inheritances, although not their educational attainment.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section II
develops two competing hypothesis, one of which predicts compensation
through material inheritance, while the other does not predict it.
Section III sets out a framework for the empirical work by defining within
and between family variables which are assumed to affect both material
Inheritance and educational attainment. Section IV presents findings
concerning material inheritance, among them income elasticities and prob
abilities of receiving an inheritance for given levels of family characteristics,
Section V is an empirical analysis of determinants of educational attainment
for the subsample of sons and daughters, while Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. Theoretical Analysis
A. Preliminary Discussion.
Ihe theoretical approach taken draws to an extent on earlier work
by the author (Adams, 1976) and by Becker (1974). It is assumed that
the donor or parent (hereafter, the donor) is an Altruist with respect to
each recipient. Only the utility levels of recipients enter the donor's
utility function and he transfers unrestricted purchasing power to them.
Notice that this does not rule out reverse transfers from the recipients
ft.
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to the donor, since payments for the reverse contributions could be inter
mingled with Altruistic transfers in the form of combined, apparent transfers
Although an Identification problem is created by this possibility, the
problem does not seem to be very important empirically, as will be shown
later in the paper.
B. First Hypothesis: Inheritances Compensatoiry
In accordance with the preliminary discussion, the donor is assumed
to transfer unrestricted purchasing power to his recipients. Following the
literature on separability in demand analysis [see Gorman (1959) and Strotz
(1959)], if he is able to preallocate his wealth among recipients, the
donor must possess a strongly separable lifetime utility function of the
form
u= F [Gj,(V + 2Grj(C^j)], (1)
\diere F* >0, the and C»,. are lifetime expenditures on consumption of the
D Kj
donor and the jth recipient respectively, and and G^^ measure the respective
contributions of the donor*s consumption and the jth recipient's consumption
to the donor's utility.^ Moreover, G must be a monotonic transformation
of the jth recipient's utility function, since only the utility of a recipient
matters to an Altruistic donor.
The donor's utility is maximized subject to his budget constraint.
where W is his wealth and the T-. are gross transfers, or lifetime ex-
u Gj
penditures on the jth recipient.^ Note, however, that the gross transfer
is not equal to the amount received by j, defined as T , due to costs of
i-5-
maklng the transfers, and
P T = T (3)
where P^. (which may depend on T_.) is the average cost of transferring
Rj •Rj
T units of wealth, (each worth one dollar).^ The net transfer of T dollars
Rj
added to an endowment of E_. comprise the wealth of the jth recipient.
Rj
Hence,
Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4),
1^ AMC =0 (5)
«D- S - ; °
where MC. = P_. + T-. dP-./dT_., the jth marginal cost of transfer,
j Rj Rj kj rj
Since this model implies equal marginal costs of transfers across
different modes of transfer, and because the marginal costs of asset transfers
are the same across recipients, our framework implies MC^ « in a
sample where asset transfers are made. From equations (5), this implies
equalization of marginal utilities for any two recipients j and i; hence
3U/3Cg. > 3U/3C^^,.
I assume an absence of systematic favoritism with respect to the
subgroup of recipients who are sons and daughters. "Hiere is said to be no
-6-
favoring if for equal consumptions, the donor receives equal marginal
utilities. Symbolically, there is an absence of favoritism if when
Cr,. = C„n, then 9U/3C_. = SU/^C--. Ihe equality of marginal costs and the
Rj R-56 Kj Kx.
absence of favoritism imply the equalization of consumption among children,
using (5) and the definition just given. In a sample where there are asset
transfers, children who have larger endowments receive smaller total trans-
o
fers. Therefore, more able offspring i^o acquire more education, or
persons with more favorable characteristics generally, receive smaller
total transfers.
My first hypothesis states that material transfers such as inher
itance are larger for those sons and daughters who also receive larger total
transfers. This view of the inheritance process really assumes that other
forms of transfer do not specialize as the principal modes of compensation.
C. Second Hypothesis: Inheritance Not Compensatory
The second hypothesis is that other forms of transfer besides inher
itance do specialize as the principal modes of compensation. The assertion
that other forms of transfer may be compensatory yet not inheritances is most
convincing in the context of nonmarket transfers, or transfers in kind.
The nonmarket transfers differ in coat depending upon who makes them, for
the reason, applicable to household commodities generally, that efficiency
of production depends on the quality of human time used to produce them.
If we therefore assume that more prosperous siblings havemcomparative
advantage in the production of nonmarket transfers, compensation takes place
through nonmarket intersibling transfers, since the theory of Altruism
predicts that donors choose the cheapest mode of transfer (see fn. 7
No comparable reason exists to expect important intersibling financial
transfers, since the cost of finaritial transfers is typically independent
of the family member acting as intermediary*
V-7-
Moreover, the existence of intersibling transfers in kind can explain
an attenuation in observed compensation through material gifts and inheri
tances, since Ic may be assumed that siblings would make less transfers
than parents unless rewarded. Thus, material transfers might even apparently
accentuate differences among siblings. In the study of intergenerational
relations, there seems to be no substitute for a detailed accounting of
the mutual contributions among family members, particularly siblings.
In this view, inheritance and financial transfers generally are a
combination of wages to wealthier siblings for intersibling transfers and
straightforward altruistic contributions, and it would not be surprising
if there were no systematic relation to individual wealth of recipients.
Nevertheless, evidence of compensation mi^t still emerge, if unanticipated
events late in the donor's life lowered the relative wealth position of
one of the siblings, provided the increase in material transfers significantly
exceeded the increase in intersibling transfers.
This reasoning would also suggest that if greater parental age were
a source of comparative parental Inefficiency in nonmarket transfers, the
attenuation of compensation would be more pronounced for gifts during the
lifetime, as age of the parents Increased.
C. Other Explanations for the Absence of Compensation.
An alternative explajiation relies on jealousy among siblings, or
negative interdependencies in their mutual consumption. Yet it seems largely
unconvincing, for reasons of symmetry in the negative interdependencies.
For example, the denial of a larger inheritance to a poorer sibling harms
the poorer in the same manner as it would the wealthier sibling were com
pensation to occur. To illustrate, let there be two recipients, and let
-a-
the utility functions of each recipient depend negatively on the other's
consumption, so that the G_. entering equation (1) are of the form
Rj
(+) (-)
Where the + and - indicate positive and negative marginal utilities respec
tively. Maximizing the donor's utility as before, we obtain
V ^ 3c^ y -
AMC^^-O
(7)
mc^ = 0
as first order conditions for transfers to recipients. But if the G„.
KJ
were symmetric functions, evaluated at the parenthetical expressions
of (7) would be equal, and total transfers would still be compensatory.
In addition, the absence of compensatory inheritance would remain unexplained.
A second explanation is that unequal inheritances encourage siblings
who receive smaller shares to overturn the will and redistribute the estate
in their favor; the donor anticipates this possibility by distributing
inheritance equally among children. But the redistribution is not costless,
and may not occur generally.Also, if the redistribution is to be in
favor of the sibling with the smaller inheritance, benefits of the litigation
should rise with inheritance size and inheritances should be more equal
as estate size increases. Yet if anything, bequests are more unequally
distributed in larger estates [see Fyjalkowski-Bereday (1950)].
Third, the donor may be uncertain about relative wealth positions of
siblings, and bequeath to them equally. Ihis explanation also seems un-
-9-
appealing if the donor bases his decisions on expected values, since there
are differences in sibling characteristics (for example, years of schooling)
f^ich cause the expected values of their wealth to differ.
In summary, the alternative hypotheses explaining absence of compen
satory inheritance appear weak, and the alternative hypothesis Is based on
intersibling transfers.
III. Data Base and Study Design
The data utilized in this study have several advantages; in this
section the advantages are discussed, and the design of the study is outlined.
The first advantage is that the data contain evidence on both education
and material Inheritance of sons and daughters, as well as education,
age, and marital status of parents and similar variables for recipients.
Second, the inheritances received are comparatively small in size, and there
fore more representative than those iij the Federal Estate Tax data. Table 1
TABLE 1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INHERITANCES
(in thousand $)
Sample
Number Receiving an Inheritance of:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31+
Nuclear
Family
(N=440)
170 80 57 22 15 19 37 26 7 7
Sons and
Daughters
(N=A10)
169 78 57 21 14 19 23 20 4 5
Full SaDq>le
(N-576)
226 100 96 26 21 23 40 30 7 7
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shows the size distribution of inheritances for the three basic samples
used in the study. It is clear from Table 1 that the vast majority of
inheritances assume values of ten thousand dollars or less, and a majority
of persons In each sample receive one thousand dollars or less. A comparison
of the first and second lines also shows ^at spouses receive exceptionally
large inheritances.
Table 2 shows the frequency of equal inheritance among siblings,
which appears to be common. However, the subsample of cases requiring
positive mean Inheritance of children shows equality to be relatively
uncommon.
Table 3 looks differently at the equality issue by calculating within
and between family standard deviations of inheritance for the basic samples.
Judged by related variation in recipient characteristics, the within family
deviation is quite small relative to the between family deviation. For
example, the within family deviation is only 35% of the between family de
viation, whereas the same ratios for individual education and income are
62% and 95% respectively.^
Variables are described in Table 4 along with their means and standard
deviations. Both individual and family level variables are utilized.
Since all of these variables except mean family income are fully described
in Table 4, attention is directed to the income variable.
Originally, income in the Sussman data is individual monthly income
of recipients, coded in nine Intervals, the uppermost of which is open.
Raw income in fact is the chief weakness of this data, if one seeks permanent
Income of the family to explain the transfers, which is lan objective of this
paper.
The income variable is refined in three steps. First, income is re-
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TABLE 2
INCIDENCE OF EQUAL INHERITANCE
SUBSAMPLE OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS
Sample and Size of
Inheritance Relative to
the Mean for Children
Decedent Married Decedent Unmarried
Number % Number %
All Cases
Above Mean 15 5.9 60 24.4
Equal to Mean 226 88.3 64 39.0
Below Mean 15 5.9 40 36.6
Total 256 100.1 164 100.0
More than one Sibling
Above Mean 15 9.0 60 33.6
Equal to Mean 136 81.9 19 16.0
Below Mean 15 9.0 40 50.4
Total 166 99.9 119 100.0
More than One Sibling
Mean Inheritance Pos-i
itive
Above Mean 15 44.1 60 36.0
Equal to Mean 4 11.8 11 9.9
Below >tean 15 44.1 40 54.1
Total 34 100.0 111 100.0
NOTE: The table computes the number of cases and corresponding percentages
where an individual son or daughter had an inheritance which as above, equal
to, or below the mean inheritance for the group of siblings. In other words,
the computation for the mean excludes all persons who were not children of
the deceased. The computation uses the logarithmic form employed in the
empirical work, where zero inheritances are coded as zero, and counted as equal
to the logarithms of one thousand dollar inheritances.
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TABLE 3
WITHIN AND BETWEEN FAMILY STANDARD DEVIATIONS
OF INHERITANCE, AND MEAN INHERITANCE
(Inheritance in Logarithms Except where Noted)
Sample
Within Family
Standard
s
Deviation
Between Family
Standard ^
Deviation
Mean^
Logarithmic
Geometric
($1000)
Nuclear
Family
.358 .933 .689 1.992
Sons and
Daughters
.308 .871 .590 1.804
Full
Sample
.357 .875 .648 1.912
NOTE: The within family standard deviation is the statistic as commonly
calculated for the deviation from family means, where the means are computed
only for individuals in the subsample. The between family standard deviation
measures the variation of family means around the grand meand for the sub-
sample .
Numbers of observations were for the nuclear family subsample, N=440;
for the subsample of sons and dau^ters, N='410; and for the full sample,
N=576.
DefcLned as j ZL (X - X, ) where X. . is the individual inheritance of
V N-1
the ith individual in the jth family and X,. is the mean inheritance for
jthe jth family.
Defined as / Z N. (X.. - X. .)^ where N. is the nuii:ber of observations
V ^
for the Jth family and X.. is the grand mean for the entire subsample
of inheritances.
The logarithmic mean is the mean of the logarithms of the inheritances;
the geometric mean is the antilogarithm of the logarithmic mean.
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TABLE 4
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Variable Definition Mean^
Standard ^
Deviation
Family Qiaracteristics
MINST
HARD
Log of Mean Family Income
in $
Marital Status of the Donor;
1 If unmarried, 2 if married
6.607
1.602
0.318
0.490
AGED
EDD
Age of the Donor in Years
Education of the Donor in
Years
70.568
7.604^
8.577
3.993^
NINH Number of Inheritors 2.527 2.190
NKIN Number of Next of Kin 4.294 1.825
NSIB Number of Siblings 2.333 1.247
Individual
c
Characteriotics
YEDR Education of Recipients
in Years
12.432 2.4'68
MARR Marital Status of Recipients;
0 if unmarried, 1 if married
NWAGR Number of Labor Force Parti
cipants in Recipient's Family
1,680 0,792
VISIT Usual Number of Visits^ 1.990 0.877
Based on subsample of sons and daughter, 1^410.
Calculation based on smaller smaple of N-392, due to missing values
EDD.
Means of Individual Characteristics are also entered wherever problems
of multicollinearity do not intervene.
Original Coding was 1 if daily, 2 if weekly, 3 if monthly, 4 if less
often.
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coded In dollars by assigning midpoints Co closed intervals and using the
13
Pareto distribution to estimate a mean for the uppermost interval.
Second, to purge transitory errors in monthly income, I use an instrumental
variable technique to create a predicted monthly income variable. Actual
monthly income is regressed on Individual characteristics, among them years
of schooling, age, number of labor force participants in the recipient's
family, race, marital status, religion, and quality of residence, and the
14
estimated equation is then used to calculate predicted or permanent income.
In the third stage, predicted individual income is averaged by family. The
mean income obtained is used as a proxy for family resources, especially
the donor's income. Mean income as estimated by this procedure is closer
to the ideal than actual mean income, as shown by its consistently super
ior performance in the estimated demand equations for inheritances and
educational attainment.
iV. Material Inheritance Equations
Due to a diversity of results, estimates of demand functions for material
inheritance are shown for several samples. The dependent variable used
throughout is the logarithm of inheritance; since a majority of observations
thereby assume a value of zero, equation errors have a truncated normal
distribution, and Tobit analysis is the appropriate technique.^ Never
theless, ordinary least squares results, which are quite different, are
shown for comparison.
Table 5 contains findings for material inheritance within the nuclear
family, comprised of spouses, sons, and daughters.Coefficients are
generally larger in absolute value in the Tobit equations, though the pattern
of significance is strikingly similar. In particular, the income elasticity.
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or coefficient upon the logarithm of family income, consistently exceeds
unity, usually with significance at the 5% level. The importance of donor's
marital state is shown by the coefficient on MARD; it is estimated that marriage
decreases inheritance in logarithms by approximately 2.0, or taking antilog-
arithms, by approximately $7,400. Age lowers Inheritance, perhaps because
of asset decumulaticm. Ihe number of next of kin (NKIN) also lowers the
inheritance,^^
Wealth indicators for the individual recipients are introduced in most
equations to test for evidence of compensatory inheritance. Years of schooling
(YEDR), number of labor force participants (NWAGR), and whether or not
married (MARR) are all measures of this kind. More schooling and marriage
raise the recipient's full income; the role of number of persons at work is
less clear. Full income of recipients would rise with the number of persons
working if enhanced market earnings exceeded losses from reduced houshold
specialization; yet the converse could hold, and the direction of effect
of this variable is uncertain. We would firmly expect more schooling and
marriage to reduce inheritance, if it were compensatory. Wherever possible,
family averages (indicated by a leading M, such as MWAGR) for these same
variables are also entered to control for full income either of other reci
pients or recipients as a whole; which of these interpretations is correct
depends on the existence of compensatory inheritance, as we will argue
shortly. However, multicollinearity inhibits entry of most averages cJn
18
recipient characteristics.
If the average number of persons working (MWAGR), for example, is an
indicator of the Income status of other recipients, it should enter with
opposing sign to nun&er of persons at work in the individual recipient's
% i
-18-
famlly. A second interpretation is possible, which is of some Interest,
Even if compensation among recipients were unimportant, means of marital
state, education, and persons at work could signify substitution away from
each and every recipient in favor of the donor. According to the latter
interpretation, mean and individual characteristics could affect inheritance
similarly. Signs on their coefficients could be the same.
Of the individual recipient variables, education and marriage enter in
the manner expected. Both are significant, althou^ this seems to be an
artifact of the inclusion of spouses in the sample, as a comparison with
Table 6 discloses. Theirefore, marital state seems to capture partially
widoi^ood of the spouse, and education, greater earnings capacity of the
spouse, and substitution in favor of other survivors.
Because of multicollinearity problems, only mean number of participaits
could be introduced in the equations, and its sign is the same as its indi
vidual counterpart. These results, taken in combination with the observations
in the preceding paragraph, suggest that full income rises with the number
of persons at work, but that substitution is against recipients 39 a whole.
Compensation among siblings seems to be unimportant.
2
Equation 5.5 drops all individual variables; a X likelihood ratio
test shows that they add significantly to explanatory power at the one per-
cent level.
The sample was limited to cases involving more than one recipient,
in an attempt to disentagle ijifluences of mean recipient characteristics
from those of other variables. Equations-5• 3 and 5.6 report the results,
20\^ch include mean recipient marital state CMMARR). It is found that
mean marital state does not matter, even thou^ individual martial state
-19-
continues to be a significant variable. The opposite pattern holds true
for number of labor force participants^ a discrepancy which is puzzling and
will receive additional comment.
Beverse contributions measured by usual number of visits (VISIT)
are of no importance in any of the equations. Turning now to the results
for sons and daughters alone In Table 6> ve observe a number of important
differences from the earlier table. Compared to the findings for the nuclear
family, these equations reveal a generally smaller and more narrowly bounded
income elasticity of material inheritance. For the superior Tobit estimates,
the elasticity is larger than one (see eq. 6,4 through 6.6). Age becomes
insignificant. The donor's marital state exerts the same quantitative effect
- as in counterpart equations of Table 5, a result which is eminently sensible.
The quite similar coefficient suggests that consumption of the spouse is a
quantity substitute for consumption of other persons, as measured by presence
or absence of the spouse, much as in Pollak*s (1969) analysis of ccmditional
demands,
A novel feature of Table 6 is the more weighty emphasis placed on number
of siblings (NSIB) as a source of tradeoff than next of kin taken at random.
The relative wealth indicators comprising schooling, marriage, and number
of persons at work bear the same signs in these equation, but schooling
becomes insignificant, and marital status much less significant for sons
and dau^ters alone. Therefore, compensation among siblings appears to be
unimportant. As in the nuclear family results, VISIT contributes little
to the explanation of inheritance; if rewards for reverse transfers are
♦ ; made, the transactions must occur during the lifetime. Equation 6.5 omits
individual variables; their contribution to explanatory power is insignificant
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2
at even the ten percent level, applying the x likelihood ratio test. This
suggests in a different way that compensation is unimportant among siblings.
Of the three individual characteristics, only marital state is significant,
and only marriage appears to contain important transitory components.
Possibly unexpected, transitory changes In wealth of a recipient at the end
of the donor's life bring about compensatory inheritance precisely because
intersibling transfers can no longer be ensured.
Equations 6.3 and 6,6 restrict the sample to cases where more than
one sibling recipient was recorded, in order to meaningfully enter averages
of recipient characteristics. Results do not change markedly.
Perhaps there is no evidence of compensation because bequeathing to
each and every son and daughter is at zero; Table 7 splits the sample further
by requiring positive mean inheritances to siblings, thereby eliminating such
global comer solutions. The estimates are less efficient because of the
smaller sample sizes and coefficients of variables biased toward zero.
Nevertheless, they convey no evidence of compensation and they do not suggest
that the previous failure to find evidence of compensation stems from the
fact that none receive an inheritance. For example, only marital state
(MARR) is significant, and education is only marginally larger relative to its
standard error. The usual test for significance nevertheless indicates
that the set of individual wealth indicators add to the explanation of inher-
itance variation.
Moving to Table 8, results are shown for a ccmbined group of nuclear
21
family and all other persons. The strategy taken is by now familiar,
but findings are again different. Let us explore these differences.
Income elasticities, especially the Tobit estimates, are far smaller
-23-
TABLE 7
SONS AND DAUGHTERS INHERITANCE EQUATIONS
RESTRICTED SUBSAMPLES
(asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable or
Statistic
TOBIT Estimates
7.1^ 7.2® 7.3^ 7.4"
MINST 1.238^
(0.379)
0.912*^
(0.270)
0.879
(0.452)
0.539
(0.340)
HARD -0.691*^
(0.155)
-0.722*^
(0.157)
-0,698^
(0.177)
-0.731^
(0,183)
i AGED -0.003
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.010)
NSIB
*
-0.408*^
(0.061)
-0.412^
(0.062)
-0.325^
(0.075)
-0.314^
(0.077)
MWAGR -0.708^
(0.180)
-0.533^
(0.167)
-0.375
(0.226)
-0.314^
(0.077)
MMARR -0.115
(0.608)
-0.223
(0.212)
YEDR -0.050
(0.040)
-0.052
(0.042)
NWAGR -0.151
(0.088)
-0.135
(0.113)
MARR -0.537^
(0.262)
-1.238^^
(0.380)
VISIT -0.067
(0,072)
-0.116
(0.080)
(CONSTANT) -2.506 -2.182 -0.655 0.036
i Standard Error 0.871 0.890 0.792 0.834
-24-
^2 8.626"^ 15.142^
N 194 194 142 142
Sample with positive mean inheritance (in logarithms), l'^»194. Number
of limit observations is 31; number of nonlimits is 163.
Sample with positive mean inheritance, number of siblings exceeds one,
N=142. Number of limit observations is 31; number of nonlimits is 111.
Estimate significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
Estimate significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.
-25-
Ihnn previously. Hiey are even InsIgnlflcant, in the restricted sample of
equations 8,3 and 8.6. The absolute size of the coefficients is in general
much reduced; for example, donor's marital state is less important. Presence
of a spouse lowers inheritance, presumably to other persons besides the
wife or husband, by approximately 1.7 in logarithms, or by approximately
$5,500. Ihe impact is this fifteen to twenty-five percent smaller than for
the nuclear family results. The Inclusion of less closely related persons
plausibly lowers both the size and probability of inheritance.
Let us turn next to a discussion of the role played by recipient charac
teristics in this heterogeneous sample. By far the most notable difference
from earlier results is the significant impact of the reverse contributions
of recipients (VISIT) on inheritance. This would suggest that persons outside
the nuclear family are rewarded, vrfiile persons inside are not. In turn we
are led to suspect that reciprocal altruism (Becker, 1974) is more prevalent
inside the nuclear family. Otherwise, results-forthe unrestricted sample
are much as we have seen in other contexts, although attenuated.
The poor quality of the restricted full sample results is surprising,
particularly the small income elasticities (see 8.3 and 8,6), We are inclined
to think that income of persons outside the immediate family receives a larger
weight in the calculation of MINST in the restricted sample, given the
dominance of spouse and children in single recipient cases, thereby lowering
the quality of income as an indicator of family resources.
Equation 8,5 omits individual variables for the unrestricted samples;
the X test affirms the importance of these explanators, although it
should now be apparent that altruistic compensation is not necessarily
the source of their importance.
T
A
B
L
E
8
F
U
L
L
SA
M
PL
E
Il
ff
lE
R
IT
A
N
C
E
E
Q
U
A
T
IO
N
S
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
E
rr
o
rs
in
P
a
re
n
th
e
s
e
s
)
V
a
r
ia
b
le
o
r
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
O
L
S
E
s
ti
m
a
te
s
T
O
B
IT
E
s
ti
m
a
te
s
8
.1
8
.2
8.
3*
^
8.
4^
8.
5^
8
.6
^
M
IN
S
T
0.
57
9"
^
(0
.1
4
6
)
0.
49
1*
^
(0
.1
4
2
)
0
.1
9
5
(0
.1
4
9
)
1.
01
9^
(0
.3
1
4
)
0.
93
4'^
(0
.2
5
3
)
0
.4
2
7
(0
.3
2
2
)
••
M
A
R
D
-0
.7
02
*^
(0
.0
7
4
)
-0
.6
85
^
(0
.0
7
1
)
-0
.6
63
^
(0
i0
7
2
)
-1
.7
56
*^
(0
.1
6
0
)
-1
.7
03
^
(0
.1
6
9
)
-1
.6
89
^
(0
.1
7
1
)
A
G
E
D
-0
.0
09
*^
(0
.0
0
4
)
-0
.0
08
^
(0
.0
0
4
)
-
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
4
)
-0
.0
14
*^
(0
.0
0
7
)
-0
.0
30
^
(0
.0
0
8
)
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
1
0
)
N
IN
E
-
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
0
4
)
N
K
IH
-0
.0
33
^
(0
.0
1
0
)
-0
.0
28
*^
(0
.0
0
9
)
-0
.0
65
^
(0
.0
2
3
)
-o
.o
ss
'^
(0
.0
2
4
)
-0
.0
61
^
(0
.0
2
1
)
M
M
A
G
R
-0
.2
73
'^
(0
.0
8
6
)
-0
.2
69
*^
(0
.0
8
6
)
-
0
.1
5
1
(0
.1
0
7
)
-0
.4
18
^
(0
.1
8
3
)
-
0
.2
6
8
(0
.1
8
7
)
-
0
.1
6
5
(0
,2
2
6
)
M
M
A
R
R
-
0
.0
5
4
(0
.3
0
2
)
0
.3
5
4
(0
.6
5
6
)
Y
E
D
R
-
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
1
8
)
-
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
1
8
)
-
0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
1
7
)
-
0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
3
7
)
-
0
.0
1
5
(0
.0
3
6
)
I ts
j
I
«
«
9-
•
1'
f
K
N
W
A
G
R
-
0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
4
3
)
-
0
.0
5
5
(0
,0
4
2
)
-
0
.0
3
6
(0
.0
4
4
)
-0
,0
9
4
(0
.0
9
3
)
-0
,0
5
3
(0
,1
0
3
)
M
A
R
R
-0
.8
55
^
(0
.1
3
1
)
0.
90
2*
^
(0
.1
3
0
)
-0
.7
13
*^
(0
.2
0
5
)
-1
,5
73
*^
(0
,2
5
6
)
-1
.4
00
*^
(0
,4
3
0
)
V
IS
IT
-0
.1
77
*^
(0
.0
3
5
)
-0
.1
48
*^
(0
.0
3
6
)
-0
.1
20
^
(0
.0
3
6
)
-0
.2
74
"^
(0
.0
7
7
)
-0
.2
12
^
(0
.0
7
6
)
(C
O
N
ST
A
N
T
)
0
.1
9
8
0
.8
1
3
1
.7
7
7
-
2
,0
0
0
-
1
,0
0
7
1
,4
8
0
0
.2
6
6
0
.2
8
0
0
.2
7
6
F
-
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
2
2
.8
3
4
2
4
.4
1
2
1
4
.3
6
7
S
ta
n
d
a
r
d
E
r
r
o
r
0
,8
1
7
0
.8
0
9
0
,6
6
5
1
.4
6
5
1
.5
9
4
1
,2
1
5
59
.2
88
®
1 t
o
N
5
7
6
5
7
6
3
8
7
5
7
6
5
7
6
3
8
7
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
5
.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
m
it
o
b
s
e
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
is
3
2
6
;
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
n
o
n
li
m
it
s
is
2
5
0
.
N
um
be
r
o
f
re
c
ip
ie
n
ts
ex
ce
ed
s
o
n
e
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
N
um
be
r
o
f
li
m
it
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
is
2
2
3
;
nu
m
be
r
o
f
n
o
n
li
m
it
s
1
6
4
.
E
st
im
a
te
is
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
d
if
fe
re
n
t
fr
o
m
z
e
ro
a
t
th
e
fi
v
e
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l.
E
st
im
a
te
is
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
d
if
fe
re
n
t
fr
o
m
z
e
ro
a
t
th
e
o
n
e
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l.
-28-
We conclude this discussion of material inheritance by utilizing the
Tobit coefficients estimated from the full sample and the sample of sons
and daughters to calculate probabilities of nonzero Inheritance (in logarithms)
Four calculations are performed for each sample based on differing combin
ations of assumptions about the donor's marital state (married or unmarried)
and mean family income (low and high for the sample of sons and daughters.)
Sons and daughters are assigned the same characteristics as recipients
in general; therefore, the computed probabilities are different only because
the Tobit equations for the two samples are different. Table 9 shows the
estimated probabilities. Sons and daughters have a consistently larger
probability of receiving more than minimal inheritance than recipients in
general. The probability for sons and daughters rises dramatically from
0.01 to 0.20 for low income families if the spouse is absent; but the chance
22
is 0.48 even in the presence of a spouse given a high income. Only in* the
case of an unmarried donor and high income is the probability ever above
0,20 for recipients in general.
V. Educational Attainment Regressions
The education of sons and daughters is an obvious alternative to material
inheritance, and we briefly investigate its determinants, especially the
linkage between education of the two generations. Table 10 summarizes
the intergenerational schooling relationship for the sample of sons and
daughters. Column totals indicate the number of children whose parent
achieved a given level of schooling. Row totals indicate the number of
sons or daughters who themselves achieved a given level of schooling. The
pronounced secular increase in schooling is apparent in either sample.
-29-
TABLE 9
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING POSITIVE
INHERITANCE IN LOGARITHMS ®
Probability for
Assumed Charac
teristics of:
Estimates used Coefficients Calculated on
Sons and Daug}iters Sample Full Sample
Recipient I^ 0.01 0.00
Recipient II® 0.20 0.04
Recipient III^ 0.48 0.06
Recipient IV® 0.95 0.35
Probability = WjT ® ^
a
Corresponds to probability of receiving an inheritance lirger than one
thousand dollars.
The equation used is 6,4.
The equation used is 8.4,
Monthly family income is assumed to be $285; the donor is assumed to
be married, aged 70, with number of siblings equal to 2 (next of kin
equal to 4 in the full sample); two persons are at work for every recipient,
all recipients are married, all have a high school education and all
make weekly visits to the donor.
Values as in d, except donor is assumed to be unmarried.
Values as in d. except monthly incon^ of the family is assun^d to be $ 1992.
Values as in d, except donor is assumed to be unmarried and monthly
family income is assumed to be $1992,
-30-
For the unrestricted sample 272 children had a parent with grade school 
education, whereas only 14 children themselves had a grade school education~ 
Although levels of schooling differ markedly, the correlation between years 
of schooling of the generations is a sizable 0.51 for all sons and daugh-
ters, and only slightly less in the restricted sample. 
Educational attainment regressions are shown in Table 11. As before, 
family level and individual characteristics are entered in the equations. 
Before discussing the results, it should be recognized that th.ere is an 
element of automatic positive correlation between family income and the 
dependent variable. 
This originates in the partial dependence of recipient's income upon 
schooling. A multiple recipient subsrunple was chosen to break this cor-
relation. Since income of other recipients is not automatically related to 
the individual's years of schooling, the correlation should be lower 
for this subsample. Yet in the context of this study, . the upward 
bias in the income effect is not a serious impediment. Because diminishing 
returns to acquisition of education ultimately prevail (capacity to acquire 
it assumed fixed; see Becker, 1975, pp. 94-102), educational attainment 
should be less income elastic than material inheritance. The upward bias 
in the income elasticity of education means that we have merely derived a 
conservative estimate of the difference in elasticities. 
Two forms are shown in Table 11. The first uses the log of sons' 
and daughters' years of schooling, the log of parents' years of schooling, 
d .d d. . f h . 1 . . 23 an prov1 es a 1rect est1mate o t e 1ncome e ast1c1ty. The second is 
an arithmetic form, which enters both schooling variables arithmetically. 
Let us first examine the famliy level variables appearing in these 
equations. Results are as expected. Estimated income elasticit~es from 
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TABLE 10
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN
Educational Attainment
of
Sons and Daughters
Educational Attainment of Parents
Grade
School
High
Stehool
College
+
Total
All Sons and Daughters
Grade School 14 0 0 14
High School 207 42 27 276
College + 51 32 37 120
Total 272 74 64
Number of Siblings > 1
Grade School
High School
College +
Total
10
160
33
203
0
29
11
40
0
16
18
34
10
205
62
N = 440, Simple Correlation between parental and children's years of
schooling = 0.513.
N = 268, Simple Correlation between parental and children's years of
schooling = 0.477.
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equations 11.1 and 11.2 are approximately 0.35, certainly far less than
corresponding estimates for material Inheritance (see equations 6.4 to 6.6).
The arithmetic equations provide virtually the same result: el^ticities
at the mean are 0,36 and 0.33 for equations 11.3 and 11.4. Restricted
sample estimates differ very little from those of the unrestricted sample.
Donor's age significantly lowers children's of schooling, in accor
dance with the vintage effects noted in Table 9. In other words, donor's
age is the negative of calendar time; educational attainment rises by a
third of a percent per annum as a family unit moves forward in time. In
conjunction with the negligible importance of the donor's age for material
inheritance (see Table 6) these findings imply a shift in favor of human wealth
24
transfers for more recent cohorts. Donor's education (EDD or LEDD in log
arithms) significantly Increases the educational attainment of sons and
daughters in all equations. We are inclined to regard this finding as an
indicator of parental efficiency in the transmission of human wealth,
since the donor's education does not appear to influence material inheritance.
Therefore parental education does not seem to measure wealth effects, but
25
efficiency of transmission.
In an effort to find evidence of compensatory transfers, we enter
the log of inheritance (LLXNH) in the equation, assuming it to be associated
26with lower educaticm. However, althou^ its sign is correct, LLINH is
not statistically significant.
Marital status (MA.RR) and usual visits (VISIT) are introduced to capture
changes in the gains to schooling, and parental contributions for the visits.
The strong negative effect of marital status is surprising because marriage
should increase the gain to schooling for males and need not necessarily
lower it for females; nevertheless, neither inclusion of recipients' sex
Variable or
Statistic
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TABLE 11
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT REGRESSIONS
(Standard Err6rs in Parentheses)
Logarithmic
11.1 11.2'
Arithmetic
11.3' 11. v
MINST 0.360
(0.027)
0.341
(0.039)
4.468
(0.329)
4.102
(0.474)
AGED -0,003
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.001)
-0.036
(0.012)
-0.032
(0.017)
EDD 0,163
(0.026)
0.173
(0.035)
LEDD 0.094
(0,017)
0.100
(0.023)
LLINH -0.001
(0,008)
-0.015
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.098)
-0.204
(0.158)
MARR -0.096
(0.036)
-0.120
(0.050)
-1.417
(0.434)
-1.652
(0.602)
RDR -0.002
(0.008)
-0.003
(0,011)
0.006
(0.103)
0.020
(0,133)
NSIB 0.004
(0.006)
0.011
(0.009)
0.024
(0.073)
0.071
(0.111)
(CONSTANT) , 0.244 0.354 -14.445 -12.311
0.487 0.390 0.515 0.415
F-Statistic 52.076 23.611 58.362 26.162
N 392 266 392 266
a
b
c
d
Dependent variable is the log of recipient's education in years.
Dependent variable is recipient's education in years.
Sample of Sons and Daughters.
Sample of Sons and Daughters, number of siblings greater than 1.
-34-
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nor a sex-marital status interaction altered the effect of MARR. Per
haps marital status is associated with early marriage, or impaired financing
of education. Usual visits are insignificant, suggesting once more that
reverse contributions are not repayed through transfers.
VI. Conclusion
This study has uncovered a number of findings with respect to the struc
ture of iBheritance and educational attainment.
First, for a sample of sons and dau^ters, material inheritance does
not compensate children for comparative disadvantages, as far as these
could be measured. Tlie explanation offered in this paper is that inheritance
stems from two sources, one of vdiich is payment for intersibling transfers,
and the other, true compensation; this combination of behavior apparently
obliterates transfer compensation but is actually evidence of it, if a full
accounting were to be made. It is suggested that inheritance samples are
thenaelves secretly heterogeneous, combining a siibsample where intersibling
transfers are important, and another where they are not. Therefore, probing
questions in relation to such transfers would enable better designed samples
to be separated into homogeneous parts where compensatory inheritance could
be fairly observed, if it existed, lliis agnosticism also lends support
to the notion that transfer taxation is not necessarily wealth equalizing,
since inheritance may actually be compensatory in bringing about unobserved
intersibling transfers, even if apparently it is not. However, it cannot be
said that this part of the theory has yet been subjected to a rigorous test.
Second, for the sample of sons and daughters, it is found that the income
elasticity of material Inheritance far exceeds the corresponding elasticity
of educational attainment, even though the latter is an upward biased estimate,
-35-
Ihis finding is strongly supportive of the Altruistic theory. Also, the
entry of donor's age in both material inheritance and educational attainment
regressions permits us to examine secular or calendar time effects on the
two forms of transfer. We are enabled to say that human wealth transfers
rise at rougjily a third of a percent per annum relative to physical wealth
transfers.
Third, comparative examination of several samples from the same data
base lead us to think that material inheritance is income elastic, especially
for the immediate family and in view of the fact that estimates are very
likely downward-biased. A downward bias is suspected simply because the
Income measure is a very imperfect proxy for parental wealth; in spite of
this, income elasticities range from 1.5 to 2.2 for the nuclear family sample
(Including spouses) and from 1.3 to 1.6 for the sample of sons and daughters.
IHie estimates for recipients in general are lower, but flawed to a greater
degree by the Imperfections noted above, and thus comparatively unreliable.
Fourth, the measure of reverse contributions by recipients to donors
does not suggest that inheritance or educational attainment is comprised of
wages for assistance to the donor per se, for the immediate family. However,
this expiration gains strength upon the inclusion of other kinds of reci
pients .
Finally, the two most important characteristics determining size of
inheritance appear to be marital state (particularly widowhood) and family
income; the two most important characteristics determining educational attain
ment are donor's education and family income.
The contribution the present work hopes to make in regard to future
research, is to suggest that a more accurate intrafamily accounting of
transfers be undertaken so that the issue of compensation can be more
-1ft-
thoroughly explored, and also to stress that parental gifts (let alone
intersibling assistance) have so far been virtually ignored, to the detriment
of a clear understanding of individual wealth formation. We would especially
stress that educational attainment and other human capital are by no means
equivalent to all gifts, since financial and material assistance also occur.
APPENDIX
^Is appendix describes the data more fully, particularly the frequency
distributions of variables utilized and their simple correlations. Statistics
are shown for sons and daughters, which are quite similar to those in omitted
samples. Table A.l shows the distribution of predicted mean incomes by inter
vals. Hiese are families with ordinary levels of income even for the time (1965);
TABLE A.l
DISTRIBUTION OF PREDICTED FAMILY INCOMES
(MONTHLY, IN $)
Income q_299
Class
300-599 600-899 900-1199 1200-1999 2000+
Number of ^
Cases
130 236 151 70 1
in only one case does monthly income exceed $2000 per month. Ranges for
the other variables were: number of siblings 1 to 6; number of labor force
participants, 1 to 5; years of education (recipients), 4 to 18; age of the
donor, 46 to 96. Few recipients among sons and dau^ters were unmarried
(only five percent), althou^ forty percent of donors were unmarried.
Table A.2 shows simple correlations among major variables used in the
study.
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FOOTNOTES
The only previous study of this question, by Fyjalkowski - Bereday
(1950), suggested that sibling inheritances are often distributed
equally, and therefore cannot be considered compensatory. However,
this conclusion was not rigorously shown. Note that throughout this
paper, the term inheritance refers to transfers at death, not to
transfers in general.
Define the total variance of wealth as , the within family variance
as th® between family variance as a^. By the usual part
itioning of sums of squares, Thus if T is the rate
of transfer taxation.
3t 3t 3t
and the overall effect on the variance of wealth would be uncertain,
since
3t ^
satory, ^diile ^^B _
3t "•
I am indebted to Marvin Sussman and Judith Gates for permission to
use their data, described in their book (coauthored with David T.
Smith) The Family and Inheritance (Russel Sage, 1970).
An Appendix to this paper characterizes the data more fully.
In fact, this is the donor's indirect utility function, which assumes
prior maximztlon with respect to Individual commodities, or that
and the G_. are function of commodities prices and expenditures on
each person (which are, in turn, present values). Prices are assumed
to be unvarying, and are suppressed for the sake of brevity.
Underlying this exposition is the fact that the T^. are sums, or
° i k ^lkl''^ lk1
(1+r)^
vrtiere is the price of transferring one dollar of the kth form of
transfer \land, human capital, household time) in the ith period to
the jth recipient, and is the number of units received by j in
> 0 , if the tax is effective and the transfers are compen-
10
11
12
13
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that period and that form. Therefore, froip (a).
^ ^ (1+r)^
E2 T
1 k "-ikj
so that P^. is a weighted average.
The theory implies that marginal costs are equated across forms of
the gransfers much are made to a recipient. Substitute (a) Into the
budget constraint (3), and maximize (1) with respect to each transfer
component separately, and it will be found that
M S: - ^^iki —S:'
(l+r) (1+r)
3U
if a transfer is made. Hence MC., . » MC. = — /X , If asset transfersIKJ j Rj
are made MC, = since taxation, etc, do not differentially relate
to recipients for asset trasfers.
Equality of consumption implies that + T^ = + T^^^, or
E^, - E„ = T_ —T_.. Thus g • > g j > T ;
Education is clearly an exception, since costs of educational transfers
are inversely related to the level of ability. Implying that education
would reinforce differences in siblings endowed wealth. See Becker
and Tomes (1976).
Tomes (197 7) stresses intersibling transfers as a reason why inheritances
are equal rather than compensatory.
For example, there is little evidence of it in the Sussman data used
in this study. See Sussman, Gates, and Smith (1970).
The standard deviation of siblings* years of education is 1.504 within
the family and 2.413 between families; similarly siblings* predicted
income had a within family standard deviation of 0.588, and a between
family standard deviation of 0.619.
The Pareto equation is useful for approximately the upper tail of income
distributions. Its form is
£nN = K - a log X, (c)
14
15
16
17
18
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where N = number of persons whose Income is a,t or above level X,
For this study, cells by recipient's age and income were created and
a was estimated on the N and X resulting from the cell calculations.
The estimate of a obtained was $. * 1.68. Bowley (1920), pp. 462-463
shows that the mean Income at or above level X^ for a Pareto distri
bution is
X « X,.
a-1 1
Hence, since X^ is known, and $, is estimated from the Pareto regression,
X can be estimated.
Hie equation estimated was Cstandard errors in parentheses)
LMINC » 5.832 + 0.083 YEDR + 0.009 ACER + 0.016 MARR
(0.008) (0.002) (P,076)
+ 0.239 NWVGR - 0.408 RACER - 0.136 RES + 0.016 RELl
(0.037) (0.103) (0.022) (0.128)
- 0.087 REL2 + 0.340 REL3 + 0.090 REL4, => 0.400, N = 583.
(0,128) (0.150) (0.034)
In this equation, LMINC =» iln (actual monthly income), YEDR •= years of
schooling, ACER = age in years; MAUR - 0 if recipient is not married,
1 ,if married; RACER = 0 if recipient is white, 1 if he is black; RES ®
quality of housing, and RELl through REL4 assume values of 1 if the
recipient is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or Eastern Orthodox, 0
otherwise (unknown category omitted).
See Amemiya (1974) and Tobin (1958) for discussions of this technique.
The basic requirements for all samples were that recipients be between
the ages of 25 and 64, the source of their income be known (\^ether
from wages, salaries, etc.), that someone in their family be currently
working, the principal wage earner be either themselves or their spouse,
education of recipients be known, and that sex of the principal wage
earner be male. These restrictions are designed to bring out the
permanent ccmiponent in measured income.
The number of spouses in the nuclear family sample was 30, nec
essitating the combination of children and spouses into one sample.
This finding can be given a quantity-quality interpretation, as in
Becker and Lewis (1973),
Ihfi problem is usually (but not always) the hi^ correlations between
individual and mean levels of the same variables. For example, the
simple correlation of mean marital state (MMARR) and individual marital
state (MARR) is 0.88 in the nuclear family sample. This correlation
drops to 0,69 in the restricted sample of equations 5.3 and 5.6.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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However, as ml^t be expected, mean education and mean family income
are closely associated in all samples.
Twice the absolute value of the difference in the logarithm of the
likelihoods is approximately distributed as > where the degree of
freedom is the difference in number of parameters fitted under two
specifications of the relation. See Brownlee (1965), pp. 111-113
for a discussion. For an application to Tobit, see Tobin (1958).
Mean recipient education was also introduced, but proved to be insignifi-
cant, and highly correlated with mean income, as noted above.
Once again, the number of recipients outside the immediate family is
too few to analyze separately.
If income were, say, three standard deviations above the average, the
calculated probability approaches unity.
Recall that MINST has the dimension of a logarithm.
The share of human wealth would also increase at a third of a percent
per annum if total material wealth transfers were also insensitive
with respect to age, and human wealth transfers rose at the rate of
increase in schooling.
This statement draws on empirical findings omitted from this draft.
Notice that the insignificance of parental education suggests that
family Income is a good estimate of parental income.
In the near future, I hope to examine the simultaneous determination of
material inheritance and educational attainment.
One such equation was where LEDR ® years of schooling in logarithms,
and SMEXR = recipient's sex-marital status interaction,
EDR = 0.255 + 0.358 MINST - 0.003 AGED + 0.094 LEDD
(0.027) (0.001) (0.017)
- 0.001 LLINH - 0.077 MARR - 0.012 SMEXR - 0.004 VISIT
(0.008) (0.043) (0.015) (0.009)
+ 0.004 NSIB , N - 392, « 0,488.
(0.006)
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